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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to explain the connection between firm size
and business strategy, one of the more important links between market structure
and market behavior.
The theory given in the paper predicts a set of propositions: (a) the
larger a firm's custom, the greater the propensity to choose additional
advertising in preference to a price cut; (b) the larger the custom, the
greater the propensity to raise price rather than increase or decrease
advertising or cut price; (c) the larger the custom, the greater the pro-
pensity to reduce quality rather than increase advertising or cut price; and
(d) the larger the custom, the less the propensity to develop cost-increasing
quality improvements rather than lower price or increase advertising.
The fundament of the theory is that the large the custom, ceteris
paribus, the large the number of "attached" customers who will pay less
(more) if price is decreased (increased), and whose revenue could otherwise
be counted on at the old price. Advertising does not affect revenue from
the "attached" customers. Quality changes are similar in nature to price
changes in this context. And the relationship of R&D activities to custom
depends upon the type of discovery that is sought.

FIRM SIZE AND MARKET BEHAVIOR:
A THEORY OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP
Julian L. Simon*
I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to throw light on how and why firms differ
in their choices among price, advertising, product quality, and R&D as
competitive variables.
This topic has two roots. A theoretical root is the observation
that there is a fundamental difference between two classes of competitive
variables. While obtaining more customers, some competitive variables
do not affect the revenue gained from existing customers, whereas other
variables do affect the amount received from customers who would buy
anyway.
An empirical root is the bewildering array of devices such as
cents-off coupons, lotteries, special promotions, special services,
and so on that we observe firms using. Why does one firm use one sort
of device at one time, whereas another firm uses another?
It is all-important to keep in mind which firms the paper is about,
and which it is not about. The context of the analysis includes Crain
Publishing' s magazine Advertising Age , a fast-food chain such as Pizza
*I appreciate helpful criticism by Walter Primeaux, Edward Rice,
and James Smith. I enjoyed the opportunity of presenting the paper at
the Marketing and Industrial Organization Workshops at the University of
Illinois, and the Industrial Organization Workshop at the University of
Chicago.
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Hut, a seller of art books such as Harry Abrams, Inc., L. L. Bean's
sporting goods offerings, semi-conductor manufacturers, Kawasaki motor-
cycles, Ozark Airlines' route from Champaign-Urbana to Chicago, and a
university extension course on "Corporate Planning with a Marketing
Focus." None of these goods is sold in a narrowly-defined market with
a homogeneous physical product, such as the beer industry or the builder's
sand industry. And the commonly-used concepts of market and market share
are hard to define meaningfully for such firms. Therefore, in place of
market share, this paper works with a firm's "custom", the number of
customers at any one moment who have some loyalty to the firm from the
previous period to the upcoming period. And, in place of the market
concept, the paper uses "market potential", meaning the number of addi-
tional customers the firm could expect to have with varying combinations
of price and other variables. More specific definitions follow later.
Firms in narrowly-defined markets, for whom the notion of market
share is more appropriate, are more difficult to think clearly about
in this connection because of the conscious interactions among them.
But it is not unlikely that the ideas developed here for the non-inter-
active firm can later be extended to firms in narrowly-defined markets,
too.
To avoid disappointment and confusion, it should be understood
what the paper will not aim to do. It will not relate the firm's choices
among competitive variables to general equilibrium analysis, or even to
market equilibrium. Instead, the context is like that of "Austrian"
disequilibrium, which views a market as in constant ferment due to a
variety of disturbances from outside the market, together with necessarily
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iraperfect attempts by entrepreneurs to take advantage of the profit
opportunities that exist as a result of the disturbances outside plus the
changes made by other firms trying to exploit opportunities for profit.
(.For discussion of the Austrian viewpoint on this matter, see Hayek, 1949,
Chapter 5, or Kirzner, 1973, Chapter 1.)
In consonance with this view of the market, firms differ in size, the
size (custom) of the firm being taken to be exogenous in this context. A
similar view of firm size is expressed, justified, and used, by other well-
accepted writers in very different contexts. For H. Simon (in the work for
which the Nobel was ostensibly given him, I believe) size of firm results
from growth process simply taken as random without further discussion. For
Arrow, the cause is differences in information costs among firms.
the combination of uncertainty, indivisibility,
and capital intensity associated with information
channels and their use imply (a) that the actual
structure and behavior of an organization may
depend heavily upon random events, in other words
on history. (1974, p. 49)
For Hayek, the congeries of fact about competition (as he define;' competition)
necessarily lead to differences in size.
That in condition of real life the position even
of any two producers is hardly ever the same is due
to fact which the theory of perfect competition
eliminates by its concentration on a long-term
equilibrium which in an ever changing world can
never be reached. At any given moment the equip-
ment of a particular firm is always largely
determined by historical accident. (1949, p. 101)
Whatever explanation or non-explanation one prefers of the differ-
ences in firm size assumed here, this assumption accords with the observed
fact that firms differ in size in any given industry. The context is not a
long-run general equilibrium where all differences have been ground down
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and all firms rendered homogenous in such fashion that it seems appropriate
to conduct the analysis in terras of a single "representative" firm whose
central characteristics all firms share. Rather, in the context of this
paper, the differences among the firm are central. This plainly is not
consistent with the spirit of market-equilibrium analysis, at least as
developed until now. And since reality plainly shows variation in firms
to be an important fact, market-equilibrium analysis simply must be set
aside for now when thinking about the issues analyzed here. In short,
either the question raised by the paper must be considered unimportant,
or the analysis must be found to be logically inconsistent, or the demands
of market equilibrium analysis ought to be disregarded here.
The examples of firms mentioned earlier, and perhaps especially the
turbulent airline industry in the late 1970' s and early 1980' s, may serve
to fix in the mind the aspect of economic reality that the paper aims to
help understand. The price cuts and increases, the changes in services
given, and the shifts in airline routes following on deregulation, increases
in gasoline prices, and the air controllers' strike and firing, exemplify
a situation in which the notion of market equilibrium seems particularly
inappropriate, and such an example offers particular justification for
conducting the analysis without the notion of market equilibrium, as is
done here.
There is no suggestion here that the equilibrium approach of standard
economics is unsound or wrong. Different approaches with different assump-
tions and different points of view are useful for different purposes. By
analogy, it is useful for a variety of scientific and practical purposes,
to assume that the sea is level, or that it tends toward being level, but
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not when one wants to understand wave motion. And if one simply assumes
that the sea is level, then one will not even try to understand what makes
some waves behave in the various ways in which they behave. In some
economic inquiries— those that focus on the response of market and perhaps
of the economy to shocks, and therefore need not attend to differences
among firms—it is appropriate to study the levels at which price and
quantity and perhaps other variables will eventually settle down. For
the purpose at hand, however—which is to understand the strategic
competitive choices made by firms that differ in their characteristics
—
market equilibrium before or after the choice need not enter the analysis.
It may be that eventually one might be able to wed the approach offered
here with a context of market equilibrium. Or on the other hand, it may
be (as I think the Austrians would argue) that even to introduce the notion
of market equilibrium here would deflect the reader's attention from key
aspects of the question that this paper seeks to understand. Either way,
I very much hope that you will not judge this effort by the criteria
appropriate to a study that inquires into market equilibrium, or expect
the use of analytic tools appropriate in that context. The tool used here
is different, and I hope that its novelty and its simplicity will be seen
as strengths rather than as an indication of incapacity to use the standard
tools. Even if the argument can be restated using the standard tools
without loss of intended meaning (about which I have doubts) the fair test
would seem to be whether the argument is put forth in sufficiently precise
form to be unambiguous, rather than whether the form is that considered
elegant in contemporary economic culture. I hope the method offered here
is seen as a new intellectual technology rather than as an inferior form
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of the standard technology. If the paper is successful in helping understand
for some firms this aspect of economic behavior that is not now under-
stood, it should be sufficient justification for the paper even if the
approach does not fit with the standard canon of equilibrium price theory.*
*I hope the reader will forgive me for going on at such length in
this fashion. But acceptance of the conventional equilibrium framework
as necessary for dealing with this question prevents acceptance of the
approach. Consider, for example, one editor's rejection
letter:
I have read your paper and unfortunately agree with the reviewer
that the paper is not suitable for publication without extensive
revisions. I didn't understand how M could be taken as exogenous
in your model. What is disturbing the system each period to prevent
it settling into a long run equilibrium? What is the stochastic
equilibrium if firms initially differ in M? Do the firms converge
to a uniform policy? In short, as the referee states, the dynamics
must be more carefully worked out.
(Dennis W. Carlton, Editor of The Journal of Law and Economics , correspondence,
September 28, 1981).
Another example is the referee's report iff the Journal of Political
Economy :
This paper consists of a contrived two period model of the world.
Accordingly, it fails to consider the effect on the steady-state
solution of either price changes or advertising. The work also
ignores the economic determinants of size of firm and seems to
assume that the distribution of firms by size is a random event
that is unrelated to price and product quality. In a simple
price quality model with competitively determined full prices any
two but not all three of the following are determined by the firm;
size of firm, price, and quality. In the context of this general
model the comparisons made by the author do not make sense. What
must be accomplished is an industry equilibrium model with adjustment
costs and a steady state solution. Then perhaps the author's results
may indicate the difference between short-run market behavior and
long-run behavior. Lastly, the theoretical evidence all suggests
that monopoly and competition produce the same product quality.
The author's results contradict this conclusion with no formal
proof.
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In addition Co being an early attempt to shed light on a particular
aspect of economic behavior, it may be that the paper's formal method can
assist Austrians in communicating some of the ideas that they ordinarily
write about using verbal logic only, and that may therefore enhance their
attempts to argue their point of view. The aim of this paper is, however,
different than the central aim of the Austrians, if I understand then
correctly. Whereas they wish to emphasize the fluidity and the indeter-
minate quality of the markets within which entrepreneurs operate, I wish
to analyze in a determinate fashion the choices that particular firms make
under particular conditions which differ from firm to firm. That is, what
is noise for the Austrians is data for this paper. But to show that the
outcomes differ detemiinately when conditions differ, which then leads to
changes in the market, which then alters the conditions of other firms and
then of the firm under analysis as well, should fit comfortably with the
Austrians' vision of the economy.
The sequence of events mentioned just above, beginning with a change
in a firm's situation and proceeding through its competitive decision to
a change in the market environment for other firms, then to choices of
tactics by other firms and changes in their characteristics, and finally
influencing the condition of the firm in question, should also make clear
how difficult it would be to construct a satisfying picture of market
equilibrium that would serve as illuminating context for issues at hand.
Such an equilibrium would require solution of multi-firm oligopolistic
competition in a determinate fashion, and there is theoretical reason to
believe (Simon, Puig and Aschoff, 1973) that such a one-pointed

determinate solution is not realistic for even two-firm duopoly, let
alone more than two firms, unless more conditions are specified that
are imaginable in any market analysis. But once again, this by no means
implies a criticism of the concept of market equilibrium for other analytic
purposes, any more than thinking of light as a particle suggests that
thinking of light as a wave is always inappropriate, or vice versa.
The analysis offered here picks up the process of doing business at
the point where relevant information has been collected and assimilated.
But this is not intended to minimize the importance of the scanning process
which such writers as Kirzner (1973, p. 35) refer to as "entrepreneur-
ship".
The firm's choice of competitive variables is known as the firm's
"strategy" to students of marketing, who routinely adduce the "character"
of the firm in addition to the state of the market and competition when
explaining the strategic behavior of firms. Economists have tended to
look outside the firm at the characteristics of the market and the number
of competitors, but in recent years this has been changing. For example, a
recent study of product innovation and other competitive strategies in the
semiconductor industry (Wilson, Ashton, and Egan, 1980) traces the causal
links empirically from a number of characteristics of the firm (including
capital availability, level of R&D spending, degree of risk taking, and the
nature of top management and its organizational control, p. 37); to the
firm's choice of strategies among product design, reliability, pricing,
and breadth of product lines (pp. 78-79); to the financial and social
performance of the firm and the industry. But there has been absent a
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theoretical basis for predicting which strategies would be adopted by
firms of different types, which is the lacuna this paper tries to enter.
This paper suggests that the nature of the firm is indeed important,
and should not be ignored. But many important relevant characteristics
of the firm are understandable in terras of standard economic concepts,
especially lagged responses to price and advertising; sunk costs of
equipment, information, and advertising; and the levels of fixed and
variable costs. The most salient of these concepts for the subject of
market structure and behavior are the twin ideas of sunkness of costs,
and lagged consumer responses. These same concepts can also give us
a more fundamental understanding of the phenomena usually explained by
"barriers to entry," but that discussion will be pursued elsewhere.
The paper begins with, and concentrates on, the choice between a
price cut and increased advertising as competitive variables in relation-
ship to the firm's size. It also suggests how a similar type of analysis
can explain which among competing firms will cut prices and quality, and
which will raise them; R&D behavior; and product "positioning" a la
Hotelling.
As it stands, the argument is purely theoretical, though some
bits of evidence bolster it in a few places. The aim—as I believe
should usually be the aim of theoretical pieces—is to make a plausible
case that the propositions drawn from the theory deserve empirical
testing. I do not offer the argument as ironclad proof that the
conclusions hold, of course; no theoretical piece can ever do that,
because theory must always simplify from reality in a variety of ways.
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If the argument is not found to be internally inconsistent, and the assump-
tions do not depart too greatly from reality, perhaps the reader will be
satisfied that the propositions are of some interest until they are dis-
proven empirically.
II. ADVERTISING VERSUS PRICE
Consider two firms operating in similar market conditions but in
situations where we can ignore interaction between them. Why does one
of them cut price and another increase its advertising? The psychologist
may attribute the differences to the personalities or the ethnic back-
grounds of the managers, and marketing men put it down to some "character-
istic strategy" of the firm, which may come down to being another label
for the competitive choices the firm habitually makes. But neither of
these sets of explanations has been very satisfying to economists.
Many writers (e.g. , Stigler, 1968; Simon, 1970) have noticed a funda-
mental difference between advertising and price as competitive variables:
Advertising to get more customers has no negative effect upon the firms'
existing customers, and perhaps has a positive effect upon them, whereas
a price-cut to increase market share reduces revenue from the firm's
existing customers. But the implications of this difference for under-
standing a firm's behavior in terms of the firm's present situation seem
to have been overlooked. The paper shows that it follows from this
difference that the larger is the firm's present custom, ceteris paribus,
the greater is its propensity to use advertising and the less its propensity
to use price cuts. This analysis bears a relationship to Adam's analysis
(1977) of advertising as a device which permits the firm to discriminate
—
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that is, to treat each customer or class of customers differently—whereas
ordinary commercial pricing of many goods does not permit such discrimination.
One can quickly prove that when price is considered in isolation,
the smaller firm has a greater propensity to cut price than the larger
firm. But the same can be shown for advertising considered in isolation.
The question is: why is the price cut relatively more attractive than
advertising when the firm is relatively smaller?*
Proof That the Firm With the Larger Custom Will Prefer Increased
Advertising to Price Cutting
The aim of this section is to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 ; A firm having a larger custom will have a greater
propensity to increase advertising than to cut price, whereas a firm
with a smaller custom will prefer a price cut .
Now some more specific definitions: By "custom" (M) is meant the
number of persons who bought from the firm in period t-1 and who will
also buy from the firm in period t if there is no increase in price,
even if the firm does no advertising (all other promotional activity
being ignored for the time being) . In the example below, the attach-
ment force that underlies market share will be a contract, which binds
the person for certain. More realistic forces include customer inertia,
*A related but more general question is: Why does a firm with a
smaller market share in t-1 generally advertise less in absolute dollars
in t than a firm with a bigger market share? Manufacturing facilities
and product cost certainly are not a sufficient explanation in many
industries, e.g., cigarettes, nor is geographical limitation. Differ-
ences in the cost of capital may be important. But the forces discussed
here must have a central role.
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the cost of changing one's behavior, habit formation, sentimental loyalty,
or any of the related forces as they are described in the marketing lit-
erature. And these inertial forces operate probabilistically and can be
modelled as a Markov process; the difference between a probability of
repeat buying, and repeat buying for certain, does not affect the anal-
ysis, however. The custom (size) of the firm is taken to be exogenous
in this analysis, as discussed earlier.
By market potential (D) is meant the function
D
t
= f(P
t
,A
t
,B
t
...)
where U = number of sales that will be made in period t
apart from present custom Q , assuming one sale
per customer
P = price
A = total advertising expenditure
B = product quality
and where other variables may be added if the decision-makers consider
them relevant to a particular decision.
The analysis abstracts from all competitive interaction among firms,
and focuses only on the shortest-run tactical choices. That is, the
analysis will be an exercise in comparative statics (or perhaps compara-
tive dynamics), examining a firm which can assume that its custom and its
demand function with respect to price or advertising (i.e., its market
potential) may be taken as given for the decision period, though the
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potential and more especially the number of "loyal" customers will be
varied to make the central point.
Consider a firm, F, that is now planning its operations for the
coming period. The firm has tentatively chosen a price of P and an
advertising budget of A. Assume that this combination of {P,A} is very
close, as close as one wishes, to the profit-maximizing point for the
firm as estimated by the firm's decision-maker (s) .* Now let the
"This point may be thought of as an equilibrium position for the
firm, according to Machlup's definition of "equilibrium, in economic
analysis, as a constellation of selected interrelated variables so ad-
justed to one another that no inherent tendency to change prevails in
the model which they constitute." (1958/1967, p. 54). I think it is
better here to avoid the term "equilibrium" for the firm, however, both
because it may be blurred with the notions of market equilibrium and
general equilibrium which are not part of the analysis here, and also
because of the general confusion surrounding the terms "equilibrium"
and "disequilibrium" which Machlup dissects so effectively (1958/1967,
pp. 43-72).
However, Machlup's model of a model, embodying the notion of equili-
brium, does seem to fit the approach taken here:
"The following scheme illustrates the step-by-step working of a
model; each step is described both in customary technical terms and in
terms of catch-phrases in everyday language:
Step 1. Initial position : "equilibrium," i.e. , "Everything
could go on as it is."
Step 2. Disequilibrating Change : "new datum," i. e. , "Something
happens."
Step 3. Adjusting Changes : "reactions," i.e. , "Things must
adjust themselves."
Step 4. Final Position : "new equilibrium," i.e. , "The situation
calls for no further adjustments."...
"In a nutshell, we have here a mental experiment in which the first and last
steps, the assumption of initial and final equilibria, are methodological
devices to ensure that Step 2 is the sole cause and Step 3 contains the com-
plete sequence of effects. The function of the initial equilibrium is to assure
us that "nothing but 2" causes the changes under Step 3; the function of the
final equilibrium is to assure us that "nothing but 3" is expected as an effect
of the change under Step 2 (although the completeness" of the list of effects
will always be merely relative to the set of variables included in the equili-
brium)." (Machlup, 1958/1967, pp. 47-49)
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decision-raaker (s) consider reducing the firm's price an amount A to (P-A)
or increasing its advertising an additional amount y to make a total
of (A+y). Assume that either small change would be marginally profitable
if the market-potential function is D; this function refers to customers
who will not "automatically" buy from firm F at price P and advertising
level A, and either change under consideration would bring one new customer.
The expenditure y equals the drop in revenue from the M customers that the
firm would have at {P,A} if it drops price to (P-A), together with the
difference between P and (P-A) charged to the additional customer; this
overall "loss" equals (M+1)A, which just equals y by assumption, by
simple Dorfman-Steiner reasoning for a profit-maximizing point. The
firm is therefore indifferent between the strategy of advertising (A+y)
and the strategy of setting price (P-A), both of which are preferable to
doing neither. The firm is also indifferent between these two options and
no change at all. (We shall assume that it would not be profitable for
the firm to both lower price to P-A and raise advertising to A+y , and
that any further drop in price or increase in advertising would not be
profitable.
)
To simplify, a zero cost of production is assumed; production with
constant marginal cost clearly leads to the same result, however. In
any case, production costs will be brought into the picture in the section
on product quality.
The firm's choices with their present values (V) may be shown as
follows, where the alternative is the superscript of V, the present
market-potential function is the first subscript, and the term "no
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contract" should be ignored for now: The period subscript in the control
variables is omitted for convenience.
(1) V^+Y = PM + PD + P(l) - (A+y)
* ' D ,no contract
where the first term on the r.h.s. represents the revenue obtained from
the loyal customers; the second term is the revenue obtained from the
customers that would be obtained with {P,A}; the third term is the
revenue from the "additional" customers obtained by advertising A+y
rather than A, along with P; and the fourth term is the expenditure on
advertising.
(2) V^~
A
= (P-A)M + (P-A)D + (P-A)(l) - Av
' D ,no contract '
A+Y P—
A
(3) V^ = \f , which is the sameD ,no contract D ,no contract
as writing
(4) Y = (M+1)A.*
*It is not the size of the potential market— that is, whether a
particular set of control variables produces D or D-l customers— that
influences the choice of advertising or price reduction; the firm in
this example is indifferent between the strategies at either market size,
to a small approximation. This may be seen in the following profit cal-
culations for the two strategies with D-l uncommitted potential customers
who will produce at {P,A}.
(5) V^
+
y = PM + P(D-l) + P (1 x ~ ) - (A+y)D-l, no contract D
(6) V^"
A
= (P-A)M + (P-A) (D-l) + (P-A) (1 x) - Av D-l, no contract v ' v %
Subtraction of (6) from (5) using (4) shows that the difference between
them is ("jr)A, a very small number in comparison to the differences
of order A we shall see when we alter the firm's custom.
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Now consider that, for some exogenous reason, a person who had
not previously been part of the potential market moves into the area
and signs a contract with the firm. Or, alternatively, we might think
of the change in putative circumstances as an upward revision by one
customer in the decision-maker's estimate of the firm's potential sales,
as a result of additional scanning of the market environment; this
interpretation would seem particularly congenial to Austrians. That is,
the firm's custom becomes "bigger" by one more customer. The firm will
then still be indifferent between advertising (A+y) and advertising A.
But if the firm lowers price to (P-A), it will now be in a considerably
less profitable situation than remaining at {P,A} or going to {P,A+y}.
This may be seen in the comparison of the two profit functions:
(7)
^.contract - PM + PD + PCI) + P(l) - (A+Y )
(8) V^~
A
= (P-A)M + (P-A)D + (P-A)l + (P-A) - A
D .contract
Subtracting (8) from (7) shows that the advertising strategy now yields
A greater profit.
This result can also be seen in the context of the Dorfman-Steiner
theorem (1954). Their basic proposition is that at the profit-maximizing
point the elasticity of demand with respect to price
P dQ
n
=
Q dP
and the marginal value product of advertising
p =P^M dA
are equal to each other
= U.
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An increase in custom Q decreases n, but leaves pi unchanged. Dorfman
and Steiner prove that when p > n, it pays to increase expenditure and
price. But in this narrowly-defined case in which market potential D
does not change (and the Q in dQ really is closer in meaning to D than
to Q), the only cause of increased advertising is the price increase,
which is a second-order difference; hence it is intuitively clear that
the increase in advertising is "relatively" small compared to the in-
dicated increase in price, in fact, nearly zero. (To show this rigorously
would be a bit difficult, and would likely require complete specification
of the market-potential function. )*
Please notice a crucial difference between this paper and that of
Dorfman and Steiner: They draw no conclusions about the relative impacts
on advertising, price change, and quality that will result from a change
*The entire analysis of this paper might be conceivably framed in
elasticities of the sort that Dorfman and Steiner used, as a couple of
readers have urged. But I believe that such a method would be less precise,
and would obscure the main insight of this paper. For example, the price
"elasticity" of loyal customers is—by definition—different than that of
uncommitted persons. But the p in the Dorfman-Steiner formulation would
necessarily be some average of the two elasticities, masking the difference
between them which is the heart of the analysis, because the Q in their
formulation does not distinguish between the two sorts of persons.
To bring out the difference between committed and uncommitted persons
would require an explicit demand formulation. Edward Rice has shown me
how this would be done for a linear sales function of the sort
A P A P
V = PM + D + D
,
where D and D are the separate advertising and sales
effects, i.e., where advertising shifts the demand function in a parallel
fashion. Assume the firm is optimising at {P,A}. Now increasing M to M+l
leads to negative marginal revenue, and hence to higher advertising and
higher price (the latter interpreted here as a lower propensity to cut
price). A more realistic sales function would raise considerable diffi-
culties in showing this phenomenon, however.
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in the firm's size. In the context of the previous discussion, their
theorem offers no guidance about whether a price rise or an advertising
increase will be more likely as a firm's custom increases and p > n;
this case will be discussed below.
It may be illuminating* to rewrite (4) as
(Aa) J = M + 1.
This suggests that the relative effectiveness of a price cut and
additional advertising depend upon the size of the custom, M.
Loosening the implicit assumption that the quantity of advertising
has no effect on presently loyal customers only strengthens the result
obtained so far. This can be seen by assuming that the benefit of y
advertising in strengthening the attachment of present customers is
worth (f. We can then find some new y which (to a small approximation,
which could be made more precise quite easily) is equal to (y - <$) f and
hence y = A. If we now add one customer to the custom, there will be
some additional benefit from y due to its effect on the additional
(M+l)th customer, hence leaving advertising at least as attractive an
alternative as it is with M customers, whereas the reduced benefits
to A of adding the (M+l)th customer are not affected at all by this
adjustment.
Now let us show that the basic proposition holds even if the
additional customer comes from within the potential market, depleting
that potential market of one of its potential customers rather than
*John Gould pointed this out to me.
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coming from outside. We first notice that the reductions in customer-
getting effectiveness of both y and A are about the same near this
profit-maximizing point: let us call the reduction e. Then (y + e) and
(A + e) are the quantities needed to get one additional customer. And
we may write, by analogy to (7) and (8)
< 7a)
^.contract " ™ + ? + P(1) + P[1 * <1T)] " (A+Y+e) and
<8a) Cl.contract " (P
"A+e)H + (P~A+e)
<TT>
+ C*^»> <D
+ (P-A-e)[l x ( (^)1 " A
Subtracting (8a) from (7a) shows that the advertising strategy yields
(A+e)[l x (r^p)] higher profit.*
To recapitulate we see that the attractiveness of an increase in
advertising relative to a price reduction is affected by the firm's
custom (by which we mean the number of customers bound to the firm by
one force or another.) This corroborates the casual observation that
the larger the firm, ceteris paribus, the greater the propensity to
advertise. The underlying reason is that the more loyal customers
that a firm has, the more it "loses" on these customers when it reduces
price. In contrast, a change in the absolute number of uncommitted
customers in the market need not influence the choice between advertising
and price reduction, though one could undoubtedly create plausible
response functions that would show the effect going in either direction
(see Simon, 1970, Chapter 2, especially p. 55).
*This is almost 2N times the difference between (5) and (6), a
point mentioned only to corroborate that (5) and (6) are roughly equal.
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Please notice that after the addition of a customer to the firm's
custom, there will again be some near-prof it-optiraizing combination of P
and A, say P, and A.. , where the firm is indifferent between using
more advertising or a price cut to achieve one more customer, were it to
decide to go after one more customer. If we now subtract one customer
from the firm's custom, the firm will no longer be indifferent between
increasing advertising and reducing price, by exactly the opposite logic
as given above; it will now find it more profitable to reduce its price.
That is, we see that adding a loyal (M+l)th customer leads to increased
advertising and decreased propensity to cut price. There is then a new
profit-maximizing point. If at that point, the process were reversed
and the (M+l)th customer were lost, it would then be relatively more
profitable to reduce price than to increase advertising relative to the
profit-maximizing combination with M+l customers. This logic would also
apply to each point between M and M+l customers, and hence we have proven
that moving from the firm's equilibrium at M to the firm's equilibrium
at M+l reduces propensity to cut price relative to the increased-advertis-
ing alternative. This may be schematised as follows:
,,. less propensity to cut price, or v . ...,»(custom = M) —c c *—— : ' l f (custom = M+l)tendency to raise price
, ..v s more propensity to cut price, n . w.,\(custom = M) < T-* ' z—1 : • ! (custom = M+l)tendency to lower price
The analysis now comes close to meeting Machlup's earlier quoted de-
scription of an equilibrium analysis for the firm (though not for an
analysis of market equilibrium or general equilibrium, of course). We
examine the firm near its profit-maximizing equilibrium, apply the shock

-21-
of an additional customer, and see that in that neighborhood the result
is an increased propensity to use advertising in comparison to a price
reduction. We also see that when the firm settles down to its new
equilibrium, a reversal of the shock would result in a decreased pro-
pensity to advertise relative to price reduction. From this it seems
fair to include that the addition of a customer reduces the firm's
propensity to cut price relative to increased advertising.
An obvious corollary of proposition 1 is that the smaller the firm's
custom, the more likely it is to cut prices.
The proposition proven above, as well as all the other propositions
in the paper, might be shown more elegantly by writing explicit sales-
response functions with advertising, price (and later, product quality)
and lagged sales as arguments, and then comparing the profit results
under various assumptions. But there is a great variety of reasonable
functions that could be written, few of them simple, and the analysis
would surely be complicated mathematically. Even more important, the
generality of the conclusion would be limited to the functions specified.
The analysis given above refers to any functional forms, which is a
considerable degree of generality. Hence the simple form of proof given
above has advantages which I hope outweigh its mathematical inelegance.
Other Pricing Behavior
The analysis given above immediately leads to additional proposi-
tions. In this section we can deduce
Proposition 2 : The larger the firm's custom, ceteris paribus, the
more likely it is to raise price rather than to decrease advertising
.
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This proposition can be deduced by running in reverse the equations
in proposition 1. It is consistent with the observation that "leaders"
in price rises tend to be larger "dominant" firms (e.g., Scherer, 1970,
pp. 164-166).
As to the choice between raising price and increasing advertising,
this is really of a different nature than the choice between lowering
price and raising advertising, because an increase in price reduces
the number of customers whereas a rise in advertising increases the
number of customers. This means that now we are faced with the complica-
tion that one of the price-rise alternatives affects both the number of
loyal customers who will buy as well as the number of potential customers
who will buy, whereas the advertising alternative affects only the latter.
The price-rise-versus-advertising-increase choice may be analysed
as follows, in the manner of (1) and (2) and assuming that the increase
in price to (P+A) loses \p loyal customers and also loses w of the
customers it would get with {P,A}
(y) V
A+Y
= PM + PD + P(l) - (A+y)
no contract
P+A
(10) V _ = (P+A)(M-<|i) + P(D-w) - Av
no contract
(11) Let [P + (M-iJ)) A + (D-co) A] = y
so that the two alternatives are equal at first. Now add one customer
by contract from outside the market
(12) V
A+Y
= PM + PD + 2P - (A+y)
contract v '
(13) V r " = (P+A)(M-ij,) + P(D-to) + (P+A) - A
contract
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Subtracting (13) from (12), and using (11) to substitute for y, we find
that the price-rise alternative has a present value higher by A than the
advertising-increase alternative. And hence we see
Proposition 3 : A price rise is relatively more attractive than an
increase in advertising when the firm's custom is larger, ceteris
paribus
.
III. PRODUCT QUALITY AND PRICE CHANGES
Proposition 4 : The larger a firm's custom, the less likely it
should be to raise quality in preference to increasing advertising
.
This proposition obviously follows from proposition 1 if we index
quality by the cost of production, because the increase in quality must
be provided to all customers, both new and loyal; and the larger the
number of loyal customers, the less attractive is the quality increase
to the firm, ceteris paribus.
Here we must bring the cost of production into the analysis. Let
C be the production cost per unit, the same at all levels of production.
A reduction in quality of a is defined as a reduction in production
cost of a dollars; an illustration is a reduction in proof of liquor,
a simple dilution with water equivalent to selling less of the product
per quart sold, and an increase in quality is an increase in proof.
Let us compare an increase in quality of a percent to an increase
in advertising y, where Ma = y, and where the resulting change in
profit will be the same given the firm's custom.
(14) vA+Y = pm - cm + pd - cd + p(i) - c(i) - (a+y)
no contract
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C+a
(15) V = PM - (C+a)M + PD -(C+a)D + P(l) - (C+a) (1) - Av
no contract
Assume y = (M+l)a so that the two alternatives are equal in value.
Now let us consider what happens if the firm's custom increases by
one person formerly outside the market who now signs a contract. Following
(7) and (8)
(16) V
A+Y
= PM - CM + PD - CD + 2P - 2C - (A+y)
contract
(17) V
C+a
= PM - (C+a)M + PD -(C+a)D + 2P - 2(C+a) - Av
' contract x ' v ' K '
Subtracting (17) from (16) leaves an a profit advantage with the ad-
vertising alternative, showing that the larger custom makes it relatively
less attractive to increase quality as a device to increase profit when
the firm has additional loyal customers.
A corollary of this proposition is that the smaller is a firm's
custom, the more likely it is to increase quality as a business strategy,
in comparison to increasing its advertising.
Proposition 5 : The larger a firm's custom, the more likely it
should be to lower quality in preference to decreasing advertising .
This proposition follows immediately from proposition 3. Proposi-
tions 3 and 4 could both be tested very neatly on the proof-changing
behavior of liquor brands. The liquor market also would provide a
good test because each firm owns many brands, and these propositions
should predict for the brand but not for the firm as a whole.
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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
Research and development expenditures are not one strategy; rather,
R&D encompasses a variety of business strategies. Among the important
R&D strategies are: (a) R&D to reduce costs of the existing product;
(b) R&D to increase the product's quality (say, for simplicity, with
the same production cost), and (c) R&D to produce new products. The
firm's custom should influence which of these strategies the firm
should choose. Let us consider them one at a time.
Proposition 6 : The larger a firm's custom, the more likely it
will be to invest in R&D that will reduce production costs, rather than
engage in an increase in advertising . Such R&D is like an increase in
price, and the proof is identical to that given above for proposition 3.
Proposition 7 : R&D to cut costs should also be relatively more
desirable than an advertising increase or a price cut, the larger the
firm's custom , by rather obvious and similar logic.
Proposition 8 : R&D to increase quality should be relatively more
likely if the firm's custom is relatively small .
The argument for proposition 8 is identical to that for proposi-
tion 3, a direct increase in quality, except that the argument for propo-
sition 8 must be phrased in terms of the probability of discovering a
quality-increasing development rather than a quality improvement for
certain.
The analysis of R&D expenditures intended to produce new products
is more complex than the analyses above. For new products the analysis
must take into account both the effect of the new product upon sales of
the old product (substitution) as well as the effect upon newly-attracted
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custoraers. In a simplified case where the prices of the old and the
new products are the same, the result may be viewed as the net number of
new customers (the total number of customers attracted by the new product
less the number of old-product customers who switch to the new product)
and the analysis is then the same as for advertising versus a price cut
(proposition 1) with the R&D similar to advertising. This would lead to
Proposition 9 : The larger the firm's custom, the more attractive
is R&D to increase the number of products, relative to a price cut .
DISCUSSION
Perhaps it would be helpful to discuss the main differences between
the approach used in standard price theory and the method discussed here.
These differences are all related to the present analysis taking as given
the observed differences among firms in a market, especially differences in
size. From this it follows that firms may rationally differ in the strate-
gic choices they make, and the task of this paper is to understand those
differences. In contrast, standard price-theoretic analysis does not assume
(and perhaps does not even allow) such differences among firms, and makes
no attempt to understand the effects of such differences.
Another key difference is the explicit inclusion of the effect
of the firm's behavior in one period upon its market behavior in the
next period, in contrast to comparative statics that excludes time-
dependent effects. This inter-period effect arises because the choice of
tactics in t influences the firm's custom in t+1, which then influences
its choice of tactics in t+1. This multi-period effect is omitted from
the usual industrial-organization analysis of markets; an example is
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the timeless standard comparative-statics analysis of the "dominant"
firm as a price leader (e.g. Scherer, pp. 164-166). This inter-period
influence also must affect any attempt to derive a market equilibrium
that begins with differences among firms. If there were to be no addi-
tional changes in the environment, some stability would surely eventuate,
cybernetic theory assures us, though it is not clear whether or not the
result would be identity among firms in characteristics and tactics. But
a continuous flow of changes in the environment is a central feature of
the reality being studied here, and I speculate that the inter-period
connection implies that these environmental changes will translate into
continuing differences among firms, to a degree that would not occur if
inter-period interaction were not present.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper is to explain the connection between firm
size and business strategy, one of the more important links between mar-
ket structure and market behavior. The concept of market share is fre-
quently adduced in literary discussion by writers on industrial organi-
zation, but it is seldom, if ever, defined rigorously or used in formal
analysis. The concept used here to measure firm size is "custom," by
which is meant the number of a firm's customers in period t-1 who will
buy from the same firm in period t=0 if price is not changed. This
concept best fits firms that do not sell homogeneous goods in narrowly-
defined markets, but rather sell products that are physically differentiated
and have a wide variety of partial substitutes.
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The theory given in the paper predicts a set of propositions such
as: (a) The larger a firm's custom, the more likely is a firm to choose
additional advertising in preference to a price cut. (b) The larger the
custom, the greater the propensity to raise price rather than to increase
or decrease advertising or cut price. (c) The larger the custom, the
greater the propensity to reduce quality rather than increase advertising
or cut price. (d) The larger the custom, the less the propensity to develop
cost-increasing quality improvements rather than lower price or increase
advertising.
The fundament of the theory is that the larger the custom, ceteris
paribus, the more "attached" customers who will pay less (more) if price
is decreased (increased) , and whose revenue could otherwise be counted
on at the old price. In contrast, advertising does not affect revenue
from the "attached" customers. Quality changes are similar in nature
to price changes in this context. And the relationship of R&D activi-
ties to custom depends upon the type of discovery that is sought.
The propositions of the paper are all thoroughly testable in
straightforward fashion.
M/D/201
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